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The first four to five years of a Private Equity (PE) Fund’s life are known as the investment period. In this
period, the fund usually draws down committed capital to make investments into portfolio companies.
Although it is typical that funds drawdown most of the capital during the first five years, GPs have the
autonomy to invest capital even after the investment period ends because of a lack of good opportunities.
However, this is uncommon because it leaves little time for the GP to create value in these investments before
they are required to exit them prior to the expiration of the fund life. This paper aims to investigate the
relationship between the drawdown distribution over the life of the fund and PE buyout fund returns. Before
doing so, this paper brings together different explanatory variables found to be significant in previous relevant
studies to form a base-case regression. Using Preqin Data, this study is based on 281 buyout funds with
vintages from 1995 to 2005. After running numerous multi-variable regression, the combination of three
factors consisting Corporate-BAA bond yield of the fund’s vintage year, Average S&P500 returns over the
Fund’s Life and the Fund Number were found to be the most significant group of variables and thus formed
the base-case regression. Vintage year was found to be insignificant when macro-economic variables were
added to the regression. Using the same principles of calculating bond duration, the drawdown distribution of
a fund can be captured in a single duration-like variable where fund distributions are time-weighted – the
earlier the drawdowns, the lower the variable. This Drawdown Distribution Variable (DDV) was shown to be
significant in explaining PE fund returns at a 95% confidence level. Though the increase in R- squared is little,
a partial F-test shows that DDV does increase the explanatory power of the multi- variable regression model.
As hypothesized, the relationship between DDV and PE fund returns is negative where the later the
drawdowns (the higher the DDV), the lower the PE returns.
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ABSTRACT 
The first four to five years of a Private Equity (PE) Fund’s life are known as the investment period. 
In this period, the fund usually draws down committed capital to make investments into portfolio 
companies. Although it is typical that funds drawdown most of the capital during the first five 
years, GPs have the autonomy to invest capital even after the investment period ends because 
of a lack of good opportunities. However, this is uncommon because it leaves little time for the 
GP to create value in these investments before they are required to exit them prior to the 
expiration of the fund life. This paper aims to investigate the relationship between the drawdown 
distribution over the life of the fund and PE buyout fund returns. Before doing so, this paper 
brings together different explanatory variables found to be significant in previous relevant 
studies to form a base-case regression. Using Preqin Data, this study is based on 281 buyout funds 
with vintages from 1995 to 2005. After running numerous multi-variable regression, the 
combination of three factors consisting Corporate-BAA bond yield of the fund’s vintage year, 
Average S&P500 returns over the Fund’s Life and the Fund Number were found to be the most 
significant group of variables and thus formed the base-case regression. Vintage year was found 
to be insignificant when macro-economic variables were added to the regression. Using the same 
principles of calculating bond duration, the drawdown distribution of a fund can be captured in 
a single duration-like variable where fund distributions are time-weighted – the earlier the 
drawdowns, the lower the variable. This Drawdown Distribution Variable (DDV) was shown to be 
significant in explaining PE fund returns at a 95% confidence level.  Though the increase in R-
squared is little, a partial F-test shows that DDV does increase the explanatory power of the multi-
variable regression model. As hypothesized, the relationship between DDV and PE fund returns 
is negative where the later the drawdowns (the higher the DDV), the lower the PE returns.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Interest in understanding PE returns from both practitioners and academics has been growing 
over the past 30 years ever since the asset class first took off in the mid-1990s. Despite the 
scrutiny it has received, private equity and its relevant performance drivers are not well 
understood. This can be attributed to a lack of familiarity, information asymmetry, and the 
questionable quality of data available for private equity research (HJK, 2013a). It is in only recent 
years that several commercial enterprises have successfully collected and documented reliable 
data on fund cash flows and returns on PE investments as the first funds raised during the mid-
1990s finally begin to exit the market.  
A PE fund is a closed-end fund in which a limited partnership is formed between the management 
of the PE funds, known as the general partner (GP), and its investors, known as the limited 
partners (LPs), who commit capital to the fund. The LPs consist largely of institutional investors 
and high net-worth individuals who commit to providing a certain amount of capital to the fund 
over a fixed period of time. These investors generally have long-term investment horizons and 
are seeking above-market returns for investments in such illiquid assets. . PE funds generally have 
ten-year life cycles. GPs are expected to make investments during the first four to five years of 
the fund, known as the investment period, before going on to harvest the investments over the 
remaining years, known as the holding period. Investments are expected to be realized and 
distributed to the investors by the end of the holding period.  
 
Qualitatively, strong deal-sourcing abilities of GPs and a steady investment pace are desirable 
features of a PE fund that LPs often look out for.  However, of the explanatory variables tested in 
preceding research, the relationship between drawdown distribution over a fund’s life and 
historic returns has not been studied. 
1.1 PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
 
This study has three primary objectives: 
1. To develop a  drawdown distribution variable (DDV) that reflects the drawdown pace 
and magnitude of private equity investments made by the fund as a percentage of the 
fund’s total committed capital – the earlier the drawdowns, the lower the drawdown 
duration, the longer the investment period, the higher the duration 
 
2. To bring together explanatory variables found to be significant by previous literature in 
a single base-case regression using the Preqin data 
 
3. To determine the significance of drawdown distribution on expected returns by using 
DDV as an additional explanatory variable added to the base-case regression 
1.2 HYPOTHESIS 
 
It is hypothesized that the drawdown distribution of a PE fund is significant in explaining PE fund 
returns where the lower the DDV, the higher the returns of the fund. The fund’s ability to 
drawdown capital early might reflect strong deal-sourcing abilities and generally strong 
macroeconomic conditions during the early years of the fund. PE funds that are only able to 
drawdown capital later in life are unable to create value in these portfolio companies before 
exiting because of the fund-life time constraint. Additionally, unlike funds that are able to make 
early investments, funds with a high DDV might be pressured to make sub-optimal investments 
before the expiration of the fund so that they are able to retain their management fees —  a 
failure to fully drawdown committed capital results in a de facto shrinking of fund size, therefore 
reducing management fees.   
1.3 EXPLAINING KEY TERMS 
 
Fund Size and Managers’ Compensation 
The size of funds (i.e. cumulative committed capital from all LPs) varies from fund to fund based 
on the fund’s target market and strategy. It is not uncommon for GPs to commit capital out of 
their own pocket; in fact, many LPs prefer to see GPs put up money as an indication of their buy-
in and aligned interest. GPs receive compensation through two kinds of fees: Management fees 
are paid to the GPs on an annual basis where the total sum is a percentage of total committed 
capital; carried interest, or carry, is the percentage of “profits” on investments claimed by the GP 
before returning the remainder to LPs. Typically most funds adopt a 2-20 fee structure where 
management fees at 2% of committed capital and carried interest is 20% of above-cost returns 
on investments made by the GP. Clawback provisions might be included to mandate GPs to return 
a portion of the management fees to LPs if the hurdle rates are not met.  
 
Life-cycle of PE fund 
Most funds have a finite life span of ten years. Although GPs can usually extend the life of a fund 
by agreement, most funds are dissolved at the end of their term. Like other fund terms, the length 
of the life of a fund varies, but the GP and LPs must come to an agreement before the investment 
period begins. Often, GPs have the right to extend the life of the fund if said extension privileges 
are granted during legal negotiations prior to the investment period or all LPs agree at the time 
of request1.   
The life of the private equity fund can be split into distinct stages. After fundraising, the closing 
period is when the partnership documents are signed, indicating that the fund is definitively in 
operation. Most funds have several closings and the final fund size and number of LPs involved 
are not known until the final closing. That said, some LPs who closed early might demand capping 
the size of the fund to prevent dilution of their stake in the fund, a right that early investors often 
exercise.  
 
Once commitments have been finalized, the fund enters the investment period, which is also 
known as the commitment period. During this period, the firm eponymously draws down capital 
                                                          
1 Some funds known as evergreen funds have no fixed term and may live on indefinitely. These open-end PE funds 
are rare and are hard to examine because their returns are examined using a different performance measure as 
compared to closed end funds. 
from the committed pool to make investments on behalf of the fund into newly sourced deals. 
The length of the investment period is typically five to seven years. This number is predetermined 
and will expire, which means that PE funds have a finite period of time in which they need to 
draw down the committed capital to make investments.  Following the investment period, the 
manager is typically permitted to make additional investments only in limited circumstances, 
including follow-on investments necessary to protect or enhance the value of investments 
already made, and completion of investments committed to or actively under consideration at 
the time the commitment period ended. There typically is a cap on the percentage of capital that 
can be expended on follow-on investments and a time limit of six months to one year after which 
the manager may no longer complete pending investments. The appropriate cap on the amount 
of follow-on investments will depend on the nature of the fund’s investment strategy.  
 
After the expiration of the investment period, funds enter what is known as the holding period 
where they will hold investments for an additional period of five to seven years to harvest the 
value of their investments. Investments are either sold piecemeal throughout this period, or can 
also be sold prior to entering the holding period. At the end of this period, if the fund still has 
unrealized investments, the GP may choose to request to extend the holding period either 
unilaterally or with advisory committee or investor consents. If the extension is not enough for 
the GP to liquidate the investment, the GP can request for another extension, sell their stake in 
the investment to another GP at a discount through the secondary market or distribute the 
investments in-kind to the LPs. All unfunded commitments net of fees and carry will be 
distributed to investors, reducing the overall fund size. These LP commitments can also be sold 
in the secondary market to other LPs prior to expiration of investment period. 
  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before we consider the body of literature, it is important to point out that because of the 
inaccessibility to PE fund returns and difficulty in collecting data, much of the research done has 
been based on differing sets of data, some more accurate or more recent than others, thus 
different research papers have presented varying conclusions. One of the objectives of this paper 
is to do a literature review and collate which factors might be relevant to the dataset from Preqin 
before testing them using the Preqin dataset and thereafter including drawdown distribution as 
an explanatory variable. 
 
Persistence and Aggregate Capital Inflows into PE Industry 
In the HJK (2013a) and HJK (2013b) suggest that persistence of performance (fund sequence 
number) and capital inflows into the PE industry are statistically significant in explaining PE 
returns. Funds with higher persistence in performance are more likely to do well in their 
subsequent funds while heavy capital inflows into the industry during vintage years in which 
funds are raised depress PE returns. This supports the fact that that too much money chasing the 
same limited deals might have a negative impact on returns because of high valuations. 
Additionally, they showed that there is no significant relationship between fund size and returns 
for buyout funds after controlling for vintage year. For Venture Capital (VC) funds, however, 
funds in the bottom quartile of fund size are found to underperform. These conclusions are 
consistent with Kaplan and Schoar’s research using a different set of data (KS, 2005).   
 
Pro-cyclicality of PE fundraising and investments 
Another significant variable in explaining PE fund returns is the macroeconomic conditions during 
the vintage year and over the life of the fund. In RS (2011), Robinson and Sensoy show that the 
amount of funds raised during boom periods are significantly higher than funds raised during 
troughs and that funds raised in hot markets tend to underperform on an absolute basis. 
However, their paper goes on to show that this underperformance disappears once the results 
are compared to a public market equivalent return, controlling for vintage year effects. Thus on 
average, PE funds are still able to provide higher returns than public market investments in both 
peaks and troughs of business cycles. This makes sense because PE funds are liquidity provider 
(sinks) when capital markets are strong (weak) and valuations are high (low), making net cash 
flows highly pro-cyclical. Additionally, their study suggests that while both capital calls and 
distributions rise with public equity valuations (i.e. they are pro-cyclical), distribution calls are 
more sensitive than capital calls.  
A study done by Phalippou and Zollo reaffirms the pro-cyclical nature of PE fund performance. In 
PZ (2005), they show that systematic risk of PE funds is not a driver of fund performance, but 
rather macro-economic conditions are more significant in explaining historic returns. As proxies 
for macro-economic conditions, the paper looks at variables that vary closely with both business 
cycles and public stock-markets: real GDP growth rate, BAA-bond yields, credit spreads, market 
portfolio performance, and option-based risk factors on a quarterly basis.  Of these, yield on 
Corporate-BAA bonds (negative correlation) and the average stock-market return (positive 
correlation) at the time of investment are most significant in explaining returns.  
So, to summarize, I will begin the analysis by building a base-case regression using proxies of the 
following explanatory variables:  
1. Vintage Year 
2. Macro-economic Conditions 
3. Persistence 
The aim is to first recreate the base-case scenario based on the current existing literature review. 
 
  
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 PREQIN DATA 
Ideally, I would have preferred to use the same Burgiss data used in HJK (2013a). However, due 
to funding constraints, I used data from the Preqin Performance Analyst Database which The 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, is already currently subscribed to. It covers up to 
6,500 funds and allows users to compare across fund types, vintage years, key performance data, 
historic performance, cash flow graphs of contributed and distributed capital. Preqin collects 
information annually from individual funds in the PE industry directly. It is comforting to note 
that in their most recent paper, Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan show that the data from Preqin is 
qualitatively similar to that in Burgiss, the database which they had used. Thus, the data used is 
reliable, accurate and of research quality. Data for 281 PE buyout funds in the vintages of 1995 
to 2000 and had a main geographic focus of North America were used in this study. The data 
used had to be manually extracted from the database Wharton’s Preqin subscription only gave 
me access to the data in a graphical form which was not usable for the purpose of this study. 
  
3.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
Construction of Drawdown Distribution Variable (DDV) 
The drawdown distribution was constructed using semi-annual non-cumulative distribution of 
the funds. The methodology of calculating the DDV closely replicates that of bond duration where 
the non-cumulative distributions are weighted by time. The discount rate of 5.95% used is the 
average 10-year treasury yield from 1995 to 2005. In general, the higher the DDV, the later the 
drawdowns (see Table I).  
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where N = number of distributions, T = number of years from vintage year, r = yield to maturity 
 
In addition to the basic DDV, a modified DDV was also constructed. The initial DDV only allowed 
us to explore the relationship between early vs late drawdowns. However, a steady investment 
pace might lead to better returns rather than early drawdowns. Early drawdowns might be a 
result of investment anxiety and over-eagerness due to a lack of experience rather than strong 
deal-sourcing abilities.  The formula simply takes the absolute difference between DDV and the 
DDV of a fund which has steady drawdown distribution (see Table I) 
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where N = number of distributions, T = number of years from vintage year, r = yield to maturity 
 
Choosing the Right Return Measure 
Till date, there is still much debate over the validity and quality of the different performance 
return measures, namely the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the fund, or the Investment Multiple. 
This paper will not discuss the pros and cons of the aforementioned measures. Instead, 
Investment Multiples will be used as the dependent variable in the multi-variable regressions 
because investment multiples have been found to explain substantially more of the variation in 
Public Market Equivalents (PMEs) return variables than do IRRs.  
 
Choosing the Right Control Variables for Base-Case Regression 
Based on the literature review, the following variables were first identified as possible control 
variables for the base-case regression 
1. Vintage Year2 
a. Average Investment Multiple by Vintage Year: Industry-wide Average Investment 
Multiple for All Funds (not management group specific) 
b. Median Investment Multiple by Vintage Year: Industry-wide Median Investment 
Multiple for All Funds (not management group specific) 
c. Weighted-Average Investment Multiple by Vintage Year: Industry-wide Weighted-
average Investment Multiple for All Funds based on Fund Dize (not management 
group specific) 
2. Macro-economic Conditions3 
a. Corporate-BAA Yield of Vintage Year 
b. Average Annual S&P500 Returns over Fund Life (10 Years)  
c. Average Annual S&P500 Returns of Last 5 Years of Fund 
3. Persistence4 
a. Fund Number: Number of Funds Raised / Serial Number of Fund 
                                                          
2 Source: HJK (2013b) 
3 Source: Public Data from Yahoo Finance and Federal Reserve database in St. Louis 
4 Source: Preqin Database 
I began the analysis by running simple linear regressions on Average Industry Investment 
Multiples as explanatory variables. Subsequently, I combined different variables from Vintage 
Year and Macro-economic Conditions in multi-variable linear regressions. It appears that Vintage 
Year factors and Macro-economic Condition factors are significant on their own. However, when 
run together, the explanatory power of Vintage Year is absorbed by explanatory power of Macro-
Economic Confidtions.  
Of the three Macro-economic Condition factors, Corporate-BAA Yield of Vintage Year and 
Average annual S&P500 Returns over Fund Life (10 Years) appear to be most significance (see 
Table II). Adding the Fund Number of the funds increases the R-squared of the regression but 
does not diminish the significance of the Macro-economic Condition factors (see Table III). The 
F-Stat is less than 4 suggesting that it adds explanatory power to the model (see Table V).  
Thus, the control variables for the base-case regression consists: 
1. Corporate-BAA Yield of Vintage Year 
2. Average Annual S&P500 Returns over Fund Life (10 Years) 
3. Fund Number 
Once the base-case regression was established, I ran two separate regressions with DDV and 
modified DDV separately (see Table III). The results reveal that only DDV was significant in 
explaining PE fund returns with a 95% confidence interval. The modified DDV was not significant 
at all.  
Lastly, to check for collinearity, I ran a correlation matrix (see Table IV) and also a multi-variable 
regression with the other explanatory variables on Corporate-BAA Yield. Correlations are 
extremely low and the regression shows that none of the factors are significant in explaining BAA-
Yield. (see Table VI) 
  
4 DISCUSSION 
 
Preqin as Reliable Data Source 
The significance of both Macro-Economic Condition factors and Persistence in explaining PE Fund 
Returns suggests that the data from Preqin is indeed reliable and qualitatively similar to that of 
the Burgiss data used in HJK (2013a) had used in their paper.  
 
Vintage Year vs Macro-Economic Conditions 
From the results of numerous multi-variable regressions (see Table III) using various 
combinations of independent variables, it appears that Vintage Year factors do not add further 
explanatory power to the regression after Macro-economic Conditions are already controlled for. 
This is not surprising since Macro-economic Conditions are year-specific and probably embedded 
in the Vintage Year. There are two advantages of using Macro-Economic Conditions rather than 
the Vintage Year of a fund. First, looking at Macro-economic Conditions takes the analysis to a 
more granular level since we can actually breakdown the Vintage Year effects to clear and distinct 
factors. As suggested in HJK (2013a), PE fund performance is significantly pro-cyclical since 
valuations both exit and entry, and organic growth of portfolio companies are necessarily 
affected by the larger economy. Thus, we can capture this effect by using average stock market 
returns over the life of the fund as a proxy for capital markets and general health of the economy. 
The positive relationship between Corporate-BAA yield during the vintage year of the fund and 
PE Fund Investment Multiple Returns is not expected. In the same aforementioned study, the 
relationship was negative. This was rationalized by the fact that buyout funds rely heavily on 
leverage to drive returns. Lower bond yields suggest deep capital markets and funds are thus 
able to borrow cheaply for levered buy-outs and other levered transactions. The difference in 
quality of data and type of funds used in PZ(2005) might contribute to this discrepancy. They 
relied on a proprietary set of data consisting of 700 PE Fund returns including Venture Capital(VC) 
funds to for their calculations. Further analysis should be done to ascertain the nature of the 
relationship, but for now, it is clear that Corporate-BAA yield is one of the most important factors 
in explaining PE Fund Returns. The second advantage of using Macro-Economic Conditions is its 
usefulness in making predictions. Unlike Vintage Year factors that are completely opaque and 
backward-looking, predictions of Macro-Economic Conditions are easier estimate and obtain.  
 
Persistence 
As shown by previous literature, there is persistence in PE fund returns. In this study and KS 
(2005), the fund number was used as a factor of persistence. To refine the regression further, 
lagged fund returns, either IRR or Investment Multiples, should be used as a high quality variable, 
as suggested by HJK and Strucke in their working paper, Has Persistence Persisted in Private 
Equity?.   
 
Drawdown Distribution as an Explanatory Variable 
The multi-variable regression (see Table III) suggest that a fund’s Drawdown Distribution is a 
significant explanatory variable of its historic Investment Multiples. As hypothesized, there is a 
negative relationship between DDV and Fund Investment Multiples where the higher the DDV, 
the lower the Investment multiple. This means that that the earlier the drawdown distribution 
of a PE fund, the higher the expected returns of the fund. This might be because of strong deal-
sourcing abilities that GPs with low DDVs have, unlike funds with high DDVs that are forced to 
make sub-optimal investments as the fund nears expiry.  
When added to the base-case regression, all other factors remained significant while adjusted R-
squared increased from 0.109 to 0.110. Although the increase in adjusted R-squared is 
considerably low, it must be noted that most regressions ran on PE Fund Returns only boast a 
maximum of a 0.200 R-squared value. More importantly, the F-Stat of the regression is 2.83, 
suggesting that DDV adds explanatory power to the base-case regression (see Table IV). 
 
Implications 
If a fund’s drawdown distribution is able to explain fund returns, LPs should watch the drawdown 
pace of funds closely to predict expected returns. Similarly, GPs should ensure they have strong 
opportunities to put out money early on the funds life before raising capital. The implication for 
fund contracts is that LPs should put a hard cap on the investment period where GPs have only 5 
years to drawdown capital. As of now, the investment period is usually negotiable with flexibility 
and good investments later on as reason for extensions. However, if high DDVs result in lower 
expected returns, LPs and GPs are better off making sure most of the committed capital is drawn 
down in the early years of the fund. Any capital that is not drawn down after 5 years will shrink 
the fund size, cutting back on management fees. However, this might create bad incentives 
where GPs put out money early without regard for quality of the investments, ultimately resulting 
in poor performance ex-ante.  
 
Conclusion 
Firstly, the study was able to identify the three most significant explanatory variables from 
numerous prior studies. A combination of Macro-Economic Conditions like Corporate-
BAA Yield and Average Return of S&P over Fund Life, and a Persistence factor, Fund 
Number, formed the base-case regression for this study. It appears that the Vintage Year 
effect completely disappears after controlling for Macro-Economic Conditions. This 
makes sense because we expect most of the Macro-Economic Conditions to be embedded 
into Vintage Year factor. Secondly, this study shows results using that Preqin data are 
qualitatively similar to that of those using Burgiss Data. Lastly, the drawdown distribution 
of funds/DDV has a significant effect on PE fund returns. After adding DDV to the base-
case regression, the adjusted R-squared increased slightly while all other factors remained 
significant. Additionally, a partial F-test shows that DDV does add significant  explanatory 
power to the regression model, although not much. As hypothesized, the relationship 
between DDV and PE fund returns is negative where the later the drawdowns (the higher 
the DDV), the lower the PE returns.  
  
Table I 
Drawdown Distribution Variable Construction 
This table shows the basic construction of the drawdown distribution variable used in the 
regression based on a discount rate of 5.56%. All three scenarios (Steady Drawdown, Early 
Drawdown, Late Drawdown) have a cumulative drawdown of 10 million. 
 
 
 
  
Year Drawdown PV PV/Price *Y Drawdown PV PV/Price *Y Drawdown PV PV/Price *Y
1 1 0.947329 0.126042 0.126042 4 3.789314 0.419539 0.419539 0 0 0 0
2 1 0.897431 0.119403 0.238806 3 2.692294 0.298081 0.596162 0 0 0 0
3 1 0.850162 0.113114 0.339342 3 2.550487 0.28238 0.847141 0 0 0 0
4 1 0.805383 0.107156 0.428624 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 0.762962 0.101512 0.50756 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 0.722776 0.096165 0.576991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 0.684706 0.0911 0.6377 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 1 0.648642 0.086302 0.690414 0 0 0 0 3 1.945925 0.318076 2.544607
9 1 0.614477 0.081756 0.735805 0 0 0 0 3 1.843431 0.301322 2.711901
10 1 0.582112 0.07745 0.774498 0 0 0 0 4 2.328446 0.380602 3.806017
Total 10 7.51598 1 5.055783 10 9.032095 1 1.862842 10 6.117802 1 9.062526
Early DrawdownSteady Drawdown Late Drawdown
Table II 
Pair-wise Regression  
This table shows pairwise regressions of the various independent variables on PE Fund Returns 
(Investment Multiples). The significance codes are ‘***’ – 0.01, ‘**’ – 0.05, ‘*” – 0.1. The 
coefficient of each variable is shown below its significance code and its standard error is in 
parentheses.   
  
Multiple R-Squared 0.042 0.053 0.058 0.061 0.046 0.001 0.018 0.015 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R-Squared 0.038 0.049 0.055 0.058 0.042 -0.003 0.015 0.012 -0.004 -0.003
Intercept *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
1.05 0.74 0.96 -0.72 1.40 1.64 1.50 1.89 1.67 1.66
[0.18] [0.24] [0.18] [0.56] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09] [0.12] [0.07] [0.06]
Vintage Year
Average Investment Multiple ***
0.34
[0.10]
Median Investment Multiple ***
0.59
[0.15]
Weighted Average Investment Multiple ***
0.41
[0.10]
Macro-economic Conditions
BAA Yield in First Year ***
42.17
[9.90]
Average Annual S&P Returns over 10 Years ***
4.90
[1.34]
Average Annual S&P Returns in Last 5 Years ***
0.41
[1.06]
Persistence
Fund Number ***
0.07
[0.03]
Drawdown Distribution
Duration ***
-0.09
[0.04]
Modified Duration
-2.66E-06
[0.05]
Modified Duration Squared
0.001
[0.004]
Individual Regressions
Table III  
Base-Case Regression with Drawdown Duration Variable 
This table shows multi-variable regressions of the various independent variables on PE Fund 
Returns (Investment Multiples). The best base-case scenario that returns the highest adjusted r-
squared includes Coporate BAA Yield, Average Annual S&P Returns over 10 years and Fund 
Number as variables. The coefficient of each variable is shown below its significance code and its 
standard error is in parentheses.   
  
With DDV
Multiple R-Squared 0.102 0.102 0.104 0.102 0.111 0.123
Adjusted R-Squared 0.095 0.092 0.094 0.092 0.101 0.110
Intercept  *
-0.87 -0.84 -0.65 -0.81 -0.93 -0.56
[0.55] [0.58] [0.62] [0.63] [0.55] [0.58]
Vintage Year
Average Investment Multiple
0.11
[0.13]
Median Investment Multiple
0.05
[0.21]
Weighted Average Investment Multiple
0.03
[0.15]
Macro-economic Conditions
BAA Yield in First Year *** *** ** *** *** ***
40.50 38.72 33.06 38.66 39.58 38.00
[9.71] [12.67] [13.20] [13.29] [9.69] [9.68]
Average Annual S&P Returns over 10 Years *** *** *** *** *** ***
4.64 4.50 4.62 4.49 4.38 4.06
[1.31] [1.46] [1.31] [1.50] [1.31] [1.32]
Persistence
Fund Number ** **
0.05 0.05
[0.03] [0.03]
Drawdown Distribution
Duration **
-0.11
[0.06]
Base-Case Regressions
Table IV 
F-Test for Base-Case Regression with DDV 
This table shows the partial F-test after including DDV as an additional explanatory variable in 
to the base-case model.  
 
 
Table V 
 F-Test for Base-Case Regression adding Fund Number 
This table shows the partial F-test after including Fund Number as an additional explanatory 
variable in to the model that includes Macro-Economic Variables only.  
 
 
 
 
Table VI 
Correlation Matrix  
 
  
Model 1: Multiple ~ BAA.Yield + Stock10 + Fund.Number
Model 2: Multiple ~ BAA.Yield + Stock10 + Fund.Number + Duration
Res.Df  RSS DF Sum of Sq F Pr(>F)
1 277 210.29
2 276 208.16 1 2.1322 2.8271 0.09381
Partial F-Test
Model 1: Multiple ~ BAA.Yield + Stock10
Model 2: Multiple ~ BAA.Yield + Stock10 + Fund.Number
Res.Df  RSS DF Sum of Sq F Pr(>F)
1 278 212.47
2 277 210.29 1 2.1844 2.8774 0.09096
Partial F-Test
Stock10 BAA Yield Fund Number Duration
Stock10 1
BAA Yield 0.04828016 1
Fund Number 0.121241929 0.06137203 1
Duration -0.078785537 -0.067447365 0.010935431 1
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